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Epistemic Judgment and Motivation 
Abstract: Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this 
question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For 
example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgment is not necessarily 
motivating to the view that epistemic judgment is not normative. This paper examines the options 
for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most 
promising approach connects epistemic judgments to doxastic dispositions, which are related to 
motivation in a fairly tenuous sense. It is also argued that this approach currently lacks a plausible 
and informative account of the nature and workings of these doxastic dispositions, and, hence, an 
explanation of the range of phenomena internalist theses typically set out to explain. The most 
promising route for developing such an account, based on recent expressivist work, is investigated 
and found inadequate for the task. 
 
1. Introduction  
The connection between moral judgment and motivation is strikingly systematic and reliable. A 
core question in meta-ethical theorizing is: what explains this connection? One explanation is that 
moral judgments are in some way necessarily connected to motivation. Perhaps moral judgment 
itself gives one a motivating reason to Φ, or perhaps it is otherwise necessarily connected to being 
motivated to Φ (e.g. by being necessarily connected to a distinct conative state). These are versions 
of moral motivational internalism:  
 
Moral Motivational Internalism (‘MMI’): Necessarily, by way of an internal 
connection, whenever an agent A judges that she morally ought to Φ, A is at least 
somewhat motivated to Φ.1 
 
The basic idea is to explain the connection between moral judgment and motivation in terms of 
moral judgments’ nature. Motivational externalists reject MMI. They claim that whatever 
	
1 It is well-known that MMI must be qualified in various ways. For example, whatever claim can plausibly 
be made about a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, it is surely a pro tanto claim. 
Furthermore, there is plausibly a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation only so long 
as the relevant person meets certain conditions (such as being ‘psychologically normal’, being (practically) 
rational, etc.). All of these issues, and potentially more, will probably also arise in the epistemic case. We 
will mostly bracket them for the sake of focusing on the broader question, but the reader should bear in mind 
that all discussed claims will have to be suitably qualified. 
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connection there is between moral judgment and motivation, it can be explained by something 
‘external’ to moral judgment.   
 The philosophical interest of the debate between internalists and externalists is in part the 
upshots these views have for our understanding of the nature of normativity. For example, 
according to internalists, a key feature of normative judgment per se is its practicality, or tight link 
with motivation (Korsgaard 1996; Ridge 2014; Smith 1994; Wedgwood 2008). Internalists and 
externalists largely agree that whatever plausibility MMI has is due to the putatively normative 
character of moral judgment. 
 Our starting point in this paper is combining this observation with the observation that there 
are other kinds of normative judgment besides moral judgment. More specifically, we are interested 
in the widely held view that epistemic judgment—for example, the kind typically expressed by the 
claims ‘S ought to believe that p’, ‘S knows that p’, or ‘S is rational in believing that p’—is 
normative. Assuming this, should we expect epistemic judgment to be reliably and systematically 
connected to motivation, too? Might there be a plausible epistemic analogue of MMI that would 
explain this – a form of epistemic motivational internalism (EMI)?2 Answers to these questions 
would seem to have important upshots for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity, 
as well as our understanding of normativity in general and how different normative domains relate.  
For example, Allan Hazlett has recently argued from clams that epistemic judgment isn’t 
necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgment isn’t normative (Hazlett 2013, 2014; cf. 
Coté-Bouchard 2017). This would in turn have deep implications for a wide-range of contemporary 
debates in epistemology. Consider debates about ‘epistemic norms’—for example, the so-called 
epistemic norm of assertion or epistemic norm of action. It is common to find these debates couched 
in normative language, such as ‘permission’ and ‘obligation.’ If it turns out epistemic judgment 
isn’t normative—or at least not normative in a way that closely parallels moral judgment—we may 
have reason to re-think the most basic vocabulary of these debates. Somewhat more indirectly, an 
increasing amount of epistemology focuses on the nature of ‘epistemic blame’ and ‘epistemic 
blameworthiness’ (Brown forthcoming; Kauppinen 2018; Rettler 2017). The most interesting work 
explicitly draws on the theory of moral blame and extends it to the epistemic domain. Blame and 
blameworthiness are closely connected to responsibility, which is in turn a normative notion. If it 
turns out epistemic judgment isn’t normative—or at least not normative in a way that closely 
parallels moral judgment—we may have reason to re-think such discussions. 
	
2 Archer (2017) asks something similar about the idea that aesthetic judgments are normative. 
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 In this paper, we are interested in the very idea that there could be a systematic and reliable 
connection between epistemic judgment and motivation, one that calls out for explanation in the 
way meta-ethicists have claimed the connection between moral judgment and motivation does. We 
think this idea is less straightforward than many seem to believe. A fortiori, we think the idea that 
there is an epistemic analogue of MMI—a claim that some prominent epistemologists have 
explicitly argued for, and others are implicitly committed to—is less straightforward as well. 
However, there is one particularly promising way to go, which connects normative judgments—
including epistemic judgments—to dispositions more broadly, rather than to motivation. We 
examine this approach in some detail, and argue that more theoretical work is required to make it 
viable. The aim isn’t to argue that such work cannot be successfully done, but to outline the details 
of a particular kind of explanatory challenge that arises for any attempt to do so. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 imposes some structure on the conceptual terrain 
and claims that there are essentially three kinds of EMI views worth considering. Sections 3 and 4 
examine specific examples of such views. Section 5 turns to a discussion of the relationship 
between two of them— ‘doxastic motivational internalism’ and ‘dispositional internalism’—and 
examines the prospects for each of meeting our explanatory challenge. We conclude that, while 
dispositional internalism is most promising, it stands in need of theoretical work before it can 
provide a viable account of epistemic judgment and motivation (Section 6). 
 
2. Epistemic Motivational Internalism? 
Any form of EMI postulates a relation—‘motivation’—between two relata: epistemic judgements 
and something else. There are different positions to take on the nature of the second relatum, as 
well as the relation itself. This underpins the options for different forms of EMI. 
What does ‘motivation’ mean in the context of epistemic judgment? We can distinguish 
two relevant senses. First, there is motivation in the strict sense, or ‘strict motivation’. Strict 
motivation is the kind of relation that holds, perhaps most paradigmatically, between desire-like 
states—desires, intentions, plans, and the like—and the actions they produce. More precisely, strict 
motivation is the sort of relation holding between a response and a set of mental states that makes 
the response a fitting target for a folk-psychological intentional explanation. If one assumes the 
orthodox Hume-Davidson model of intentional explanation, strict motivation is the sort of causal 
relation that holds between responses and sets of desires and beliefs that allow us to properly 
describe the responses as intentional.  
 Second, there is motivation in a loose sense, or ‘loose motivation’. Loose motivation is a 
broader sort of causal connection between a mental disposition and its output—broader than the 
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causal connection that holds in those cases in which intentional descriptions are proper. Of course, 
not just any sort of connection (and, hence, not just any sort of mental disposition) plausibly counts. 
Even in a broader sense of ‘motivation’ (on which it has a meaning distinct from ‘causation’) not 
any kind of causal relation between a mental disposition and its outputs is a suitable model for the 
causal operation of normative judgements. For example, when a person is disposed to shake in fear 
in response to some triggering condition that reminds her of a traumatic event, she does have a 
mental disposition with certain sorts of outputs. But this kind of disposition and how it causally 
connects to its outputs surely isn’t the kind of connection assumed to hold for normative judgement. 
Hence, the relevant sort of causal connection that characterizes the kind of disposition connected 
to normative judgement must be restricted in some way. For example, the connection might be a 
rational connection. We will return later to the issue of how to understand ‘loose motivation.’ For 
now, all that matters is that loose motivation should be understood as a causal relation between a 
mental disposition and its outputs that is significantly broader than strict motivation, and doesn’t 
have to share strict motivation’s characteristic features. 
With this distinction in place, what about the second relatum of the relation postulated by 
EMI? Here, we can distinguish at least two possible positions. First, we might hold that this relatum 
is some range of actions or intentions. For example, epistemic judgements might be internally 
connected to actions of inquiry, such as seeking further evidence, taking another look at the 
evidence one already has, and so on. Second, we might hold that this relatum is a certain range of 
doxastic states, such as belief, disbelief, or suspension of belief. For example, judging that you 
ought to believe that Hartmann is the killer might be connected to coming to believe that he is the 
killer. 
With these distinctions in place, we can distinguish four possible forms of EMI. These fall 
into two broad camps. In one camp, we have views that postulate an internal connection of strict 
motivation for epistemic judgements. These are forms of ‘Strict Motivational Internalism.’ One 
possibility here is the view that epistemic judgement strictly motivates a range of intentions and 
actions. This would seem to be the closest possible epistemic analogue of MMI. After all, a 
connection of strict motivation to actions/intentions is exactly the sort of connection that proponents 
of MMI are concerned to identify, albeit between actions/intentions and moral judgments, as 
opposed to epistemic ones. Let us call this view ‘Traditional Motivational Internalism’ (‘TMI’). 
Second, there is the view that epistemic judgments strictly motivate a certain range of doxastic 
states, such as belief, disbelief, or suspension of belief. Such views are still quite close analogues 
of MMI. After all, they merely differ in their position on what the relevant normative judgements 
motivate, not how they do it. Let us call this view ‘Doxastic Motivational Internalism’ (‘DMI’). 
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 In a second broad camp, we have views that postulate an internal connection of loose 
motivation for epistemic judgements—‘Loose Motivational Internalism’. Such a connection can 
again either be between epistemic judgments and actions/intentions, or epistemic judgments and 
doxastic states. But the distinction between these two possibilities won’t matter in what follows. 
So we will focus on a doxastic states version of the view. We call this kind of view ‘Dispositional 
Internalism’ (‘DI’). Such a view seems, at first sight, less analogous to MMI than forms of strict 
motivational internalism—though we will discuss this point further later on. The crucial issue for 
now is whether any of these forms of EMI are plausible. 
 
Table 1.1 Varieties of Epistemic Motivational Internalism   
Relatum  Relation with Epistemic Judgment   
Strict Motivation  Loose Motivation 
Actions or intentions   
 
Traditional Motivational 
Internalism (TMI)   
? 
Doxastic states   Doxastic Motivational 
Internalism (DMI) 
Dispositional Internalism 
(DI) 
 
3. Strict Motivational Internalism 
In this section we discuss whether and to what extent forms of strict motivational internalism are 
plausible. We argue that strict motivational internalists face a dilemma, because both TMI and DMI 
are problematic. On the first horn, we argue that there is a simpler explanation than TMI for the 
phenomena TMI is supposed to explain. On the second horn, we argue that any form of DMI comes 
with robust and controversial commitments in the philosophy of mind and action. To make things 
manageable, we focus our discussion by looking at specific proposals made in the literature. 
 
3.1 Traditional Motivational Internalism 
On first sight, it might seem implausible that an internal connection to actions and intentions is 
what is characteristic of epistemic judgements. However, as we’ve pointed out above, there may 
be a connection between epistemic judgments and actions of inquiry. For example, as Kappel and 
Moeller (2014) observe: 
 
Epistemic Judgment-Motivation Connection (I): there is a reliable and systematic 
connection between sincere knowledge-attributions of the form ‘S knows that p’ and being 
motivated to terminate inquiry into whether p.  
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Knowledge-attributions are typically used to express what they call ‘K-judgements’. So according 
to Kappel and Moeller, K-judgments are reliably and systematically connected to being motivated 
to terminate inquiry. By inquiry, they mean ‘actions such as taking an extra look at the scene, 
performing calculations or checking them for errors, going through the steps of a proof, wondering 
whether the evidence supports a particular conclusion or not, thinking about possible biases that 
might affect one’s evaluation of the evidence, and so on’ (2014: 1532).  
 Kappel and Moeller’s proposal is that this observation is best explained by: 
 
 K-judgment Internalism: Necessarily, by way of an internal connection, whenever an 
 agent A makes a K-judgment, A is pro tanto motivated to terminate inquiry with respect 
 to p (2014: 1531). 
 
Their aim in defending K-judgment internalism is to deploy it in an argument for epistemic 
expressivism about knowledge-attributions. According to that argument, utterances of the form ‘S 
knows that p’ express desire-like states—in particular, desire-like states underpinning an agent’s 
motivation to terminate inquiry. Here we restrict our attention to K-judgment Internalism. 
 The view seems to imply that whenever one K-judges, one is already engaged in inquiry 
as to whether p—which is obviously false. But a more nuanced observation can be put as follows. 
When people make knowledge-attributions of the form ‘S knows that p’, then, if they are engaged 
in inquiry as to whether p, they are systematically and reliably motivated to terminate inquiry into 
whether p; if they aren’t engaged in inquiry as to whether p (but acknowledge an interest, and 
someone suggests inquiring into p, for example) then they are reliably and systematically motivated 
not to do so (2014: 1532). We’ll just assume for sake of argument that K-judgment Internalism can 
somehow be modified to explain this. 
 We might wonder whether the factivity of knowledge attributions, as opposed to anything 
normative about K-judgments, underlies the observations that K-judgment Internalism is supposed 
to explain. To judge ‘S knows that p’ is to judge that p, which, in light of considerations about the 
transparency of belief, arguably just is to believe that p (or at least entails that one believes that p). 
Perhaps their initial observation really amounts to the observation that there is a reliable and 
systematic tendency in people not to be motivated to inquire into things they already believe are 
the case. Such an observation wouldn’t seem to support K-judgment Internalism. But Kappel and 
Moeller argue that there is no such reliable and systematic tendency in the case of mere belief; 
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according to them, we must appeal to the normative dimension of K-judgments to account for the 
sort of behaviour they are interested in. 
 They appeal to cases in which it is intuitive that a person believes that p but would 
appropriately continue being motivated to inquire into whether p. Consider the famous high-stakes 
bank cases (DeRose 1992; Stanley 2005). Here, a person believes the bank will be open on 
Saturday, yet it seems appropriate for them to continue being motivated to inquire into whether the 
bank will be open on Saturday. Indeed, the thought goes, it seems appropriate for them to inquire 
further precisely because they don’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday (as described in 
the case). The upshot is that something beyond the mere factivity of knowledge-attributions 
underlies the pattern. Perhaps the normative dimension of knowledge-attributions does.  
 One response is to argue there are similar sorts of cases in which a person intuitively knows 
that p, yet it seems appropriate for them to continue inquiring whether p. Brown’s surgeon case 
might be an example (Brown 2008). In general, assuming knowledge doesn’t require credence 1, 
there can be cases in which an attributor judges that S knows that p, but remains unsure whether p. 
When the stakes are high enough, it may be natural to expect the attributor to continuing inquiring 
whether p.3 These are controversial issues, and addressing them in detail would take us too far 
afield. In any case, we are unconvinced by K-judgment Internalism for other reasons.4   
 In particular, it’s not obvious that K-judgment Internalism is the best explanation of the 
connection between K-judgment and inquiry. For example, an alternative explanation is that 
knowledge is the goal of inquiry. Call this the K-goal thesis:  
 
K-goal thesis: For any agent A, A’s inquiry into whether p is successful, from the 
epistemic point of view, when and only when A comes to know that p.  
 
The basic idea is that agents inquiring whether p who come to make a K-judgement, naturally lose 
their motivation to inquire into whether p, and thereby become—as Kappel and Moeller would put 
it—‘motivated to terminate inquiry’ into whether p. But, this is just an instance of the general 
phenomenon that agents tend to lose their motivation to achieve a goal when they judge themselves 
to have accomplished the goal. When these factors obtain, they combine to constitute an agent’s 
motivating reason to terminate inquiry into p. Thus, this explanation is externalist insofar as it 
requires appealing to motivational states not internal to K-judgment itself.  
	
3 Thanks to [omitted] for raising this point.    
4 Kappel and Moeller consider and discuss the surgeon case objection (2014: 1538), but do not address the 
general recipe proposed here for constructing counterexamples to K-judgment Internalism.  
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 One might challenge the idea that knowledge is the goal of inquiry (Kappel and Moeller 
2014: 1547). Perhaps there are many such goals—for example, perhaps sometimes it is having a 
sufficient reason to believe, and perhaps sometimes it is certainty. However, our point only requires 
that knowledge is a goal of inquiry, which it very plausibly is. What is doing the explanatory work 
in this appeal to the K-goal is simply that people’s tendency to lose their motivation to achieve a 
goal when they judge themselves to have achieved it is a general phenomenon. Appeal to the K-
goal has explanatory power simply insofar as it would subsume a particular case under this more 
general phenomenon. Even if there are other goals of inquiry, it's quite plausible that knowledge is 
one of them, and that whenever people judge themselves to know things, they tend to stop inquiring 
because they've met this particular goal of inquiry (or some goal it encompasses).  
 Why think knowledge is a goal of inquiry? Kappel and Moeller may be able to defend K-
judgment Internalism at this level of the dialectic. Recall, their aim in defending K-judgment 
Internalism is defending a form of epistemic expressivism. They might agree that Epistemic 
Judgment-Motivation Connection (I) is best explained in terms of the idea that knowledge is a goal 
of inquiry. But they could insist that this latter idea would in turn be best explained by the idea that 
utterances of the form ‘S knows that p’ express certain desire-like states.5  Such explanatory 
connections may lend support to K-judgment Internalism after all. But we remain pessimistic. For 
a start, this approach comes with the issues for K-judgment Internalism discussed above. It comes 
with worries about the factivity of knowledge attributions, and the general recipe for 
counterexamples to K-judgment Internalism. While those issues remain far from conclusive, there 
are other attractive explanations of the assumption that knowledge is a goal of inquiry. For example, 
perhaps knowledge is a goal of inquiry because—as Fantl and McGrath (2009) have argued—
knowledge that p is necessary and sufficient for treating p as a reason for further action and belief. 
On this approach, knowledge is a highly valuable epistemic state; as such it is a natural goal of 
inquiry.  
 On a more general note, although we shouldn’t expect EMI to be exactly like MMI, K-
judgment Internalism seems disanalogous to MMI in the wrong sort of way. The pattern being 
explained here seems open to explanation in terms of considerations about the goal of inquiry, 
rather than considerations about the nature of epistemic judgment. These aren’t differences we 
should expect to find simply in light of the fact that we are comparing moral judgment with 
epistemic judgment. 
	
5 Thanks to [omitted] for raising this point.   
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 While we’ve focused specifically on Kappel and Moeller’s proposal, the lessons learned 
seem to apply to any form of TMI. TMI postulates a relation between epistemic judgment and 
actions and it is simply difficult to imagine what other sort of actions epistemic judgment could be 
internally connected to besides inquiry.6  Of course, we may be missing some important conceptual 
possibility. If so, whatever that view is would be worth exploring.  
 
3.2 Doxastic Motivational Internalism 
Perhaps there is a reliable and systematic connection between epistemic judgment and motivation 
to believe, or be in some other doxastic state. Veli Mitova (2011) is a good example of someone 
who thinks so. She makes the following claim:  
 
 Epistemic Judgment-Motivation Connection (II): ‘It seems trivial […] that one cannot 
be genuinely curious about some aspect of the world, and not be moved by at least a class 
of one’s epistemic judgments.’ (Mitova 2011: 60). 
 
She argues this is best explained by: 
 
 Ought-to-believe Internalism: There is a necessary connection between making an 
 epistemic judgment and being moved to believe in accordance with it (Mitova 2011: 58). 
  
For our purposes, what is significant about this sort of view is that, rather than positing some kind 
of internal connection between epistemic judgment and action, it posits a direct connection between 
epistemic judgment and belief. Furthermore, Mitova herself explains what she means by ‘being 
moved’ as follows: ‘being motivated, or moved, by a normative judgment means that one either 
tries to comply with it, or recognizes that one has done something wrong in not trying to comply 
with it’ (2011: 59). In our terms, she seems to have strict motivation in mind. 
	
6 This would explain why Kappel and Moeller’s view is the only form of TMI we’ve come across in the 
literature. Recently, Michael Ridge (2018) has challenged Kappel and Moeller on the basis of the worry about 
transparency of belief considered above. In his discussion, he goes on to develop a sophisticated view about 
the relationship between epistemic judgment and motivation. One way of developing the view is to take a 
line similar to Kappel and Moeller’s, combined with a thesis about pragmatic encroachment, rather than 
direct claims about knowledge-ascriptions (Ridge 2018: 154). Ridge’s proposal requires endorsing pragmatic 
encroachment of a fairly robust variety (a stakes based, SSI-style encroachment). This is of course 
controversial, but further discussion would take us too far afield, so we will simply leave this as a choice 
point in the dialectic.   
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Interestingly, there are meta-normative theorists who don’t directly engage with the issue of 
whether there is an epistemic analogue of MMI, but who are nevertheless committed to the idea, 
and who moreover seem to be committed to strict motivation in a way similar to Mitova. Consider 
the views of those who have defended epistemic expressivism in other ways than by starting from 
claims about motivational internalism. Expressivists hold that normative judgments are (at least 
partially) desire-like states. For example, Allan Gibbard (2003) suggests that epistemic judgments 
(in particular knowledge-attributions) are plans to rely on the knower’s judgment in one’s own 
belief formation. He (2012) is also explicitly committed to the idea that there are plans to believe 
(or at least to have certain sorts of credences). And Michael Ridge (2007) suggests that epistemic 
judgments partially consist in ‘plans about how to go about revising and updating our beliefs, and 
that these plans can, perhaps indirectly, have a bearing on what beliefs we come to abandon or 
adopt’ (2007: 101) and involve ‘epistemic endorsement of certain procedures for deciding what to 
believe’ (2007: 103). These theorists, too, seem committed to the idea that we can be strictly 
motivated to believe. 
 While DMI may avoid the worries faced by TMI, it raises other issues. First, how often do 
people believe things on the basis of forming epistemic judgments? Typically, people seem to 
believe the things they do, for example, because of observations they make about the world, or 
things they hear from others—not because they make overt epistemic judgments. Second, if people 
form beliefs simply upon judging that p, we might wonder what makes Epistemic Judgment-
Motivation Connection (II) special. In what way does it highlight anything particularly interesting 
about epistemic judgment, per se? These are important questions. But at least two points are 
immediately relevant in response.  
First, there are more complex kinds of cases in which people do make overt epistemic 
judgments and seem to adopt certain doxastic attitudes in response. For example, you are 
conducting a scientific experiment and thinking about the evidence. You find yourself saying, ‘I 
wish the results had been different, but the evidence supports p, so I believe that p’, and thereby 
coming to believe that p.  
The second point is the following. Even when people believe things on the basis of 
perception, for example, they are plausibly guided (however implicitly) by background epistemic 
judgments to the effect that beliefs should be formed on the basis of sufficient evidence (for 
example), and about what counts as evidence for what, and so on. The reason why people form 
beliefs about the environment in the way they do is plausibly partially explained by such 
background regulative epistemic judgments. So, if the reader is concerned about the idea of a thesis 
that focuses on seemingly rare cases of agents forming overt epistemic judgments, we invite them 
	 11	
to shift their focus to these regulative judgments. The relevant point remains the same.  
 Perhaps most importantly, though, this form of internalism seems to imply that belief is 
intentional. More specifically, the suggestion that people can be (strictly) motivated to believe 
seems to commit one to the idea that people can believe at will. This is the controversial thesis of 
doxastic voluntarism. Orthodoxy would have it that (at least as a matter of psychological fact) the 
extent to which people can believe things at will—in a direct way, such as forming the belief right 
now that you’re not reading an English sentence—is extremely limited, if possible at all (Alston 
1988). Some philosophers even argue that believing at will is conceptually impossible (Williams 
1973; Adler 2002; Church 2002; Buckareff 2014). 
 Of course, there is a lot to say here. For a start, Mitova has her own responses to worries 
about doxastic voluntarism.7 She makes two relevant points. First, she claims that action itself is 
no more voluntary than belief ‘in a totally brute unconstrained sense of voluntariness’ (2011: 57). 
The idea is that just as we can only believe things for reasons, we can also only act for reasons. 
And in this sense, belief and action are on a par. Second, while we don’t seem to have direct 
voluntary control over our beliefs, we have various kinds of indirect control—such as control over 
how attentive we are to evidence.  
 We don’t find these arguments particularly convincing. Regarding the first, Mitova is right 
to point out that people believe things for reasons. But this point has limited utility in the context 
of defending the kind of voluntarism DMI seems committed to. The kind of voluntarism at issue is 
to be understood in terms of strict motivation. There seems to be a gap between the idea that belief 
is responsive to reasons and the idea that epistemic judgment comes with a motivation to believe. 
The fact that an attitude is responsive to reasons doesn’t imply anything about its relation to 
motivation. Indeed, it is plausible that there are important differences between the way belief is 
responsive to reasons and the way our actions are responsive to reasons. 
Mitova might respond as follows. She can agree that ‘strict motivation’ should be 
understood in terms of intentional explanation, but then argue that what counts as an intentional 
explanation is much broader than we seem to be assuming. In particular, she could argue that 
intentional explanation simply requires showing that certain states are in some sense responsive to 
reasons (doing Φ intentionally is just doing Φ for a reason, in the right kind of way). On this picture, 
belief might seem to count as an intentional activity; and so, by our definition of strict motivation, 
belief would seem to be something that can be strictly motivated. But then all one is committed to 
	
7 Gibbard and Ridge have things to say about voluntarism too. Some of their remarks proceed along lines 
similar to Mitova’s first point in what follows (Gibbard 2012; Ridge 2018). 
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in saying that belief can be strictly motivated is the idea that belief is responsive to reasons. And 
this doesn’t seem controversial after all.  
This line of thought strikes us as misleading. Even if we concede that doing Φ intentionally 
is just doing Φ for a reason in the right kind of way, there is a difference between doing Φ 
intentionally and intending to Φ (Ryan 2003). I might be bending my knees intentionally while I 
go for an afternoon run, without specifically intending to bend my knees. As we understand the 
idea, a response is a fitting target for intentional explanation if that response is the outcome of a 
connection between a set of mental states and the agent’s intending to Φ (not merely ‘intentionally 
Φ-ing’). Perhaps there is an interesting sense of ‘intentionally Φ-ing’ which amounts to a kind of 
responsiveness to reasons. But this is surely very different from what we have in mind when we 
talk about strict motivation.8  
Concerning the second argument, many would agree with Mitova that there is some kind of 
indirect way in which we have control over our beliefs. The problem is that this observation doesn’t 
seem relevant to the project of defending forms of EMI that focus on doxastic states against 
worrying upshots. In particular, the idea that we have (merely) indirect control over our beliefs at 
most suggests a picture on which our epistemic judgments are connected to certain actions of 
inquiry (such as being attentive to evidence). Such a connection doesn’t call out for anything like 
DMI as an explanation. Indeed, to the extent that our indirect control goes through actions of 
inquiry, perhaps this observation calls out for something like TMI as an explanation. But we’ve 
already seen that the prospects for TMI as the best explanation of the connections we observe 
between epistemic judgment and actions of inquiry are dim.  
 Each of these arguments merits an in-depth discussion in its own right.9 However, even 
without doing so there is an important further observation to make. In virtue of being committed to 
doxastic voluntarism, DMI’s commitments in the philosophy of mind and action are controversial 
and robust. After all, doxastic voluntarism isn’t compatible with just any plausible view in the 
philosophy of mind and action. So DMI is hostage to the truth of views that are so compatible. Of 
course, adopting any form of motivational internalism is itself a robust theoretical commitment. 
	
8 Defending doxastic voluntarism in this way may amount to committing oneself to something more like the 
claim that belief can be ‘loosely motivated’. The possibility that we are misinterpreting certain philosophers 
as being committed to DMI is something we consider below. Our aim here is primarily to consider DMI as a 
theoretical option, and outline some of the issues it raises. 
9 For defenses of doxastic voluntarism, see Ginet 2001; Nickel 2010; Peels 2014. For reasons-responsiveness 
accounts of voluntary belief, see Owens 2000; Ryan 2003; Heironymi 2009; Steup 2008; Shah 2002.  
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However, the commitments that come with DMI are far more robust than just a commitment to 
internalism.  
 Note that things are distinctively different for MMI: nothing in MMI requires us to take on 
commitments in other areas of philosophy that aren’t compatible with any plausible view in these 
fields. Hence, to adopt DMI is to incur controversial commitments that go well beyond what we 
are committed to by simply adopting internalism. Ceteris paribus, we should prefer views that 
aren’t theoretically costly in this sense. So there is good reason to avoid doxastic voluntarism and, 
hence, DMI. That is, staying as neutral as possible on doxastic voluntarism is a desideratum for any 
form of EMI.  
 This isn’t a fatal problem for DMI, but it motivates looking elsewhere. DMI seems to 
present us with a real epistemic analogue of MMI. But it does so at a significant cost. If there is a 
less controversial form of EMI, this would, therefore, be an attractive option.  
 
4. Dispositional Internalism  
The two forms of Strict Motivational Internalism seem to present a dilemma: on one hand, 
embracing TMI, it seems right to talk about a judgment-motivation connection. But it’s far from 
clear that an internalist thesis is required to explain the connection: when epistemic judgment is 
connected to intentional states or activities, such as inquiry, there are other motivational states, 
external to epistemic judgment itself, doing some of the work in explaining the relevant connection. 
On the other hand, if the proposed connection doesn’t concern actions—as in DMI—then, while 
an internalist explanation of the connection might be plausible, we come up against controversial 
commitments like doxastic voluntarism. With this dilemma in place, it is worth considering whether 
DI fares better. 
Any form of DI is committed to the idea that we should understand ‘motivation’ loosely. 
Bob Beddor (Beddor 2016) has put forward a proposal that seems relevant here. He is interested in 
defending a form of EMI that focuses on doxastic states—but he frames his thesis in a way that is 
responsive to the worry that there is something too volitional or intentional-sounding about talk of 
‘motivation to believe’.  
 He points out that such talk can be understood as a metaphorical way of putting the more 
concrete idea that people are disposed to believe things under certain conditions:  
 
 Epistemic Judgment-Motivation Connection (III): Typically, if a psychologically 
 normal  agent sincerely  judges that she’s epistemically obligated to adopt doxastic 
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 attitude D towards p, then she’ll be at least somewhat disposed to adopt D towards 
 p (Beddor 2016: 54). 
 
Beddor doesn’t directly turn to an internalist thesis to explain this. Instead he develops a semantics 
for the epistemic ‘ought’ which, if true, would explain this connection. Since Beddor’s semantics 
for the epistemic ‘ought’ implies an internalist thesis about epistemic ‘ought’-judgments, we’ll 
simply take a cue from Beddor and suggest the following: 
 
 Dispositional Internalism (DI): Necessarily, by way of an internal connection, 
 whenever an agent A makes a self-directed epistemic obligation-judgment, A is pro tanto 
 disposed to adopt doxastic attitude D towards p.  
 
It should be clear that DI isn’t exactly an analogue of MMI. But that doesn’t rule out that 
both DI and MMI naturally fit within a broader unified picture of normative judgements. Perhaps 
both are particular instances of a general phenomenon. Specifically, it’s plausible that all normative 
judgements come with dispositions to respond in various ways. Perhaps these dispositions differ 
relative to the respective domains, not merely in what they produce, but also in how they produce 
it. In the case of the moral domain, for example, we might say these are dispositions to be strictly 
motivated. In the epistemic domain, the way responses are produced is different. This is one story 
proponents of DI might tell to explain how their form of epistemic internalism is related to MMI. 
We said earlier that we shouldn’t expect EMI to be exactly like MMI. And according to this story, 
the differences between DI and MMI are simply differences we should expect to find in light of the 
fact that we are comparing moral with epistemic judgment. 
 Note that the difference between DMI and DI isn’t merely terminological. It is clear that 
DMI and DI are substantially different: they involve different claims about the relation between 
epistemic judgements and belief. However, given the prima facie oddness of ‘motivation to believe’ 
talk, one might wonder whether DI is the view that putative DMI theorists really had in mind in the 
first place. That is, the availability of DI raises the question of whether anyone is actually committed 
to DMI—or whether there is a reason to be so committed—given that one could equally endorse 
DI.  
 Indeed, at this point proponents of DMI—for example, the expressivists above—might 
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reply that they have been read uncharitably.10 They might hold that, while their view about the 
connection between practical judgments and motivation is best understood strictly, they can also 
hold the loose view for normative judgements generally. Such an expressivist might hold, for 
example, that all normative judgments are non-representational states that play a certain role in 
governing our mental states and events. But this governing role follows the desire-action model 
only in the case of practically normative judgements. While expressivists such as Gibbard and 
Ridge explicitly characterize their meta-epistemological views in terms of desire-like states, 
perhaps we should read notions such as ‘plan,’ ‘endorsement,’ and ‘deciding’ in the epistemic case 
more loosely. They aren’t talking about plans, endorsements, or decisions in the normal sense, but 
rather in a technical sense that is more in line with DI.11 
This move is definitely possible. But, as we argue next, it is also a move that expressivists, 
as well as others tempted by DI, should think through carefully.  
 
5. Explanatory Challenge for DI  
Despite the potential drawbacks we’ve highlighted, DMI has a significant theoretical benefit that 
DI doesn’t. First, note that any form of motivational internalism is (at least partially) an attempt to 
explain something: namely, the way normative judgment is reliably and systematically connected 
to other sorts of events or states. For example, MMI has been put forward as a thesis that explains 
why and how moral judgment is reliably and systematically connected to action. Why is it so 
puzzling to judge that one really morally ought to give to charity and yet fail to do so when the 
occasion arises? It is because of the internal connection between moral judgment and action—or 
	
10 It certainly seems as though the authors in section 3.2 are committed to DMI. For example, Mitova appears 
to explicitly frame her view in terms of strict motivation. And some version of Strict Motivational Internalism 
seems to fall straight out of the commitments of epistemic expressivists. So it’s not as though we’ve made 
an obvious mistake in attributing DMI as opposed to DI to those theorists. 
11 One point of clarification is important to avoid confusion. Although both Ridge and Gibbard claim that 
normative judgements are ‘plans’ or attitudes of ‘endorsement’ in a technical sense (see e.g. Ridge 2014: 
111-8 or Gibbard 2012: 169-177), the way their notions are technical differs from the way they would have 
to be technical to count as ways of filling out DI. For example, on Gibbard’s account, plans in his technical 
sense can do some significant things ordinary plans cannot do. First, while ordinary planning proceeds from 
one’s own evidence, Gibbardian plans treat this as a special case and allow for planning for all sorts of 
contingent circumstances where planning proceeds from another person’s evidence (Gibbard 2012: 174). 
Second, while ordinary planning normally proceeds on the assumption that one will act on the plan, when 
the occasion arises, Gibbardian plans can be for situations that one knows are merely hypothetical (Gibbard 
2012: 175). However, Gibbard still seems to hold – and he never says anything to the contrary – that the way 
plans in his sense govern whatever it is they govern is no different from the way ordinary plans govern 
intentions (the only difference he seems to hold is a difference in what they govern (and what follows from 
this) not in how they govern (Gibbard 2012: 176)). That is, the relation that holds between a plan and a 
response is supposed to be the same in all cases – the one we find in ordinary plans. And this means that 
Gibbard’s plans aren’t technical in the way DI requires. 
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so the internalist explanation goes.  
 However, while motivational internalism is supposed to explain this phenomenon, the 
thesis that there is an internal connection between certain judgements and something else, i.e. 
motivational internalism, is itself something we require an account of. What is the nature of this 
internal relation and how is it that normative judgments bear it to other things? These are questions 
that plausible internalist theses must answer. For moral judgements, explaining this is part of what 
Michael Smith (1994) has called ‘the moral problem.’ And, of course, this explanatory challenge 
arises whenever we postulate an internal connection of the sort characteristic of motivational 
internalism.  
In the moral case, in which the connection of normative judgements to action is prominent, 
we have a clear and obvious folk-psychological model to account for that connection: the reliable 
and systematic connection between desire-like states and action that has been at center stage in the 
meta-ethical debate surrounding motivational internalism. Specifically, wherever we assume that 
the connection is strict motivation, we have a clear folk-psychological model to account for the 
connection. In fact, this is exactly how most authors account for MMI, even those who aren’t 
expressivists (see e.g. Copp 2001; Smith 1994; Tresan 2006). 
 DMI shares this advantage with MMI: it explains the reliable and systematic connection 
between epistemic judgments and other responses and also provides an informative model of the 
nature of this internal connection in terms of an independently understood folk-psychological 
model. To give an account of the relation between epistemic judgements and beliefs, proponents 
of DMI only need to appeal to strict motivation, which is something we have a robust independent 
understanding of. Of course, the applicability of this model in the case of DMI is controversial, but 
this doesn’t change the fact that proponents of DMI have a model for the internal connection they 
postulate, as well as models as to why this connection holds. 
 On first sight, the situation is quite different for forms of DI, which don’t seem to offer an 
equivalent model to account for the connection. In fact, the formulation of DI we have considered 
here on behalf of Beddor seems to merely reformulate the claim that there is an internal connection 
between epistemic judgements and beliefs in terms of dispositions. Clearly, this isn’t really an 
account of that connection: it tells us neither what the relation between epistemic judgement and 
belief is, nor does it explain how epistemic judgement comes to stand in that relation to beliefs. It 
merely tells us that there is a causal relation between epistemic judgement and belief such that 
when one forms the former one also forms the latter. To make the account fully feasible, more 
needs to be said. This brings us back to the notion of ‘loose motivation’ we introduced earlier. What 
this challenge essentially amounts to is to give an account of what ‘loose motivation’ is, as well as 
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an account of in virtue of what loose motivation holds between two relata.  
This is a serious theoretical challenge and a response must meet several desiderata. First, it 
must plausibly distinguish loose motivation from other causal connections, and must give an 
account of the kind of disposition that is relevant for loose motivation. Second, loose and strict 
motivation must be clearly distinguishable. Specifically, loose motivation shouldn’t exemplify the 
features of strict motivation that raise worries for DMI. But, third, either strict motivation must be 
a special case of loose motivation or both loose and strict motivation must be special cases of a 
more general connection. This requirement derives from the fact that both MMI and EMI are to be 
seen as instances of a more general phenomenon that characterizes all normative judgements. 
Specifically, if some connection to motivation is taken to be what is distinctive of normative 
judgements – the guiding assumption of our inquiry here –, the way in which normative judgements 
(strictly and loosely) motivate must, plausibly, be related in some way. Hence, anyone who 
endorses DI faces a significant theoretical challenge, namely to provide a general and unified 
theoretical account of the way normative judgment produces other sorts of responses. Meeting these 
desiderata is, by no means, trivial. In fact, on first sight it isn’t exactly clear whether folk-
psychology has the resources for such an account — one that is truly general and can properly 
account for the individual cases. 
Let us end by raising the stakes and criticizing what is a natural way of trying to meet this 
challenge. This is to build an account of loose motivation by using strict motivation as a model 
while trying to abstract away from the features of strict motivation that are problematic in, for 
example, the epistemic case. Given we have a good and independently understood model for strict 
motivation, this seems like a good starting point for meeting our challenge. 
To illustrate how this idea might be pursued, consider the following suggestion that focuses 
on plans as the basic model.12 Consider plans in the ordinary sense and how they produce actions. 
What is distinctive about plans is that they play a structuring, organizing, regulating, and controlling 
role vis-à-vis our intentions. That is, the way in which plans strictly motivate actions is in virtue of 
the regulative role they play in our mental economy with regards to intentions. Once we have this 
role in view, we might hold that mental states are able to play such a role not (just) for intentions 
but (also) for other mental states, such as beliefs or emotions. If this is correct, abstracting away 
from the specific role of plans in the ordinary sense to a more general phenomenon – namely a 
regulative plan-like role vis-à-vis mental responses –, we now have a model for thinking about 
	
12 There are other states one might use as the basic model. We take it, though, that what we argue here applies 
mutatis mutandis to all cases in which the basic model are states that strictly motivate, i.e. where the broader 
relation is explained in terms of the narrower one. Thanks for [omitted] for drawing us out here. 
	 18	
mental states with a particular feature, namely a certain regulating role in the formation of other 
mental states. Note, though, that such mental states – ‘plans’ in a more technical sense of the word 
– would then produce responses in a way that is similar to (a certain form of) strict motivation, but 
which isn’t quite strict motivation. After all, such mental states would operate exactly as plans in 
the ordinary sense do, except that they wouldn’t regulate intentions. If the way that plans strictly 
motivate, however, has something to do with their role vis-à-vis intentions, this means that we now 
have a model for loose motivation, namely in terms of the regulative role that we identified by 
looking at plans in the ordinary sense. Specifically, what we’ve done is to use some form of strict 
motivation to develop a model for loose motivation, one that could be used by a proponent of DI 
to account for the way normative judgement connects to certain responses. 
 Is this approach feasible? The problem with it is that on closer inspection it is unclear how 
we should understand it. After all, if an appeal to plans is to be helpful in accounting for features 
of normative judgments, the relevant feature must actually be a feature of plans. Hence, the 
distinctive regulative role that is being appealed to here must actually be the regulative role of 
plans. However, even if we assume that there are states that play a plan-like role in the regulation 
of attitudes other than intentions, it is unclear why the way these states regulate other attitudes 
shouldn’t fall under the model of strict motivation, too. After all, the way plans regulate our mental 
economy does fall under that model. Of course, we can stipulate that there is a distinctive non-plan 
like way of structuring, organizing, regulating, and controlling mental states, and that plans—in the 
ordinary sense—are a special case of states with such a role. But then, it seems, we are merely 
assuming the features we wanted an account of. 
Note that we aren’t arguing that, generally, the strategy of using the basic case of some folk-
psychological attitude and abstracting from it to generalize in relevant ways isn’t feasible.13 This 
is a common strategy in philosophical psychology and action theory. A paradigm example is desire. 
Here philosophers start with the folk-psychological notion of desire and abstract from this familiar 
state to a more general class of states—which philosophers now tend to label ‘desires’ —that share 
certain crucial features with desires in the ordinary sense.  
However, there is a crucial difference between this kind of case and the current proposal for 
DI. In cases where we legitimately generalize from the particular case to a more general class, what 
makes the generalization legitimate is that we have good reason to assume that we can fruitfully 
understand the features possessed by the general class in terms of the relevant features of the 
individual case. The particular case provides a model that allows us to understand the relevant 
	
13 Thanks to [omitted] for raising this issue. 
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features of the more general class. For example, what all desires in the technical sense have in 
common is that they play a certain role in intentional explanations, a feature paradigmatically 
possessed by desires in the ordinary sense. And so desire in the ordinary case provides an instance 
of the feature we want to pick out, but also provides us with a model for how to understand the 
workings of the feature in question. The problem we highlighted for the above account, however, 
is that these legitimizing features seem absent. What the proponent of DI needs to provide is an 
informative model of loose motivation. And it isn’t clear how the suggested account would provide 
that. Let us explain. 
 When we abstract away from plans in the ordinary sense we aren’t starting with a state that 
loosely motivates, but with a state that strictly motivates. Hence, if our broader sense of plans 
retains the way plans in the ordinary sense motivate, it seems we can at most generate an account 
of a general kind of strict motivation, not loose motivation. On the other hand, if we abstract away 
from the specific way plans motivate, it is difficult to see how we still count as using plans as a 
model for motivation. It is then no longer the case that we have used the particular case to generalize 
to the feature we wanted an account of. Hence, such an account wouldn’t provide us with a model 
that would allow us to understand how the internal connection between normative judgements and 
various responses is supposed to be understood. It wouldn’t enhance our understanding of the 
specific ways such mental states regulate other mental states, or anything along those lines. It would 
merely tell us that states in the general class regulate mental states somewhat like plans, but not at 
all in the way plans do. 
 Hence, it seems that moving to this ‘technical’ level doesn’t advance the dialectic between 
DMI and the DI: either the features we assume just are the features we find in strict motivation, or 
we simply stipulate the features we require and thereby fail to provide an account. 
 
6. Conclusion  
We started with a choice between two forms of Strict Motivational Internalism, neither of which 
looked particularly promising. TMI lacked plausibility as an internalist thesis, and DMI raised 
worries about voluntarism. DI looks like a compelling way through the horns of this dilemma. But 
we’ve ended by noting that moving from DMI to DI actually reveals a new sort of dilemma.  
 While DMI faces worries about voluntarism, it comes with resources that can help explain 
why there is a necessary connection between epistemic judgment and motivation. Meanwhile, DI 
seems to avoid the voluntarism worries, but it does so at an explanatory cost. Unlike DMI, it’s not 
clear that it has the resources needed to explain why there is a necessary connection between 
epistemic judgment and certain doxastic dispositions. Indeed, it seems that the most such an 
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account can do is restate the view at this point.  
 The purpose of this paper hasn’t been to argue that there is no epistemic analogue of MMI. 
That would be interesting, because it would seem to tell us something deep and important about 
the nature of epistemic normativity. It might even suggest that it’s a mistake to think of epistemic 
judgment as genuinely normative after all. As we said above, Hazlett and others have argued from 
clams that epistemic judgment isn’t necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgment 
isn’t normative. We also pointed out that this would in turn have deep implications for a wide-
range of contemporary debates in epistemology, such as debates about the epistemic norm of 
assertion or epistemic norm of action, or recent work on ‘epistemic blame.’ If it turns out epistemic 
judgment isn’t normative—or at least not normative in a way that closely parallels moral 
judgment—we may have reason to re-think such discussions. 
 But we have examined the landscape and identified what we think is the most promising 
analogue of MMI, namely DI. We have also identified further theoretical work that needs to be 
done in order to demonstrate that DI is ultimately viable. Given how much contemporary 
epistemology seems to rest on an adequate resolution of this issue, this is a worthwhile project. 
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